Prepared for the Invisible Hand Seminar on October 19, 2024, hosted by the Adam Smith Program at George Mason University. Sarah Gustafson explores Tocqueville's ideas on self-interest related to Christian ethics.
Sarah H. Gustafson - Biographical Summary:
Sarah H. Gustafson is an academic affiliated with The Catholic University of America, specializing in political theory and philosophy. Her research focuses primarily on Alexis de Tocqueville, exploring the intersections of democracy, religion, and morality in his works. Gustafson has delved into how Tocqueville’s writings, especially on self-interest and civil society, can be enriched through a Christian lens. She often brings a theological perspective to her analysis, particularly examining how Tocqueville’s ideas resonate with Christian virtue. In addition to her scholarly contributions on Tocqueville, Gustafson is engaged in broader discussions on the moral foundations of democratic society.
Summary of Gustafson’s Paper:
In Opening the American Heart: Considering Tocqueville’s intérêt bien entendu in Christian Terms, Sarah H. Gustafson explores Alexis de Tocqueville’s concept of intérêt bien entendu, or self-interest rightly understood, through the lens of Christian theology. She argues that while this concept is typically understood as a political or utilitarian idea, Tocqueville's intention was to frame it within a Christian context, connecting self-interest with virtue and the common good.
Tocqueville’s concept, introduced in Democracy in America, posits that individuals can act out of self-interest while simultaneously promoting societal well-being. Gustafson emphasizes that intérêt bien entendu suggests self-interest, when properly directed, strengthens political and civil associations that support both individual and communal prosperity. While some scholars have interpreted the concept in political or utilitarian terms, Gustafson asserts that it has deeper moral and spiritual dimensions when viewed through a Christian lens. For Tocqueville, self-interest, if well understood, aligns with Christian virtue and can guide individuals toward actions that benefit others as well as themselves.
Major Themes:
Self-Interest and the Common Good: Gustafson begins by examining Tocqueville’s idea that individuals, while pursuing personal interests, often contribute to societal well-being. This aligns with Tocqueville's belief that democratic citizens recognize that their personal success is interconnected with the success of others, making intérêt bien entendu a pragmatic yet ethical principle.
Ambiguity in Interpretation: The ambiguity of intérêt bien entendu has led to varied interpretations, with some seeing it as purely utilitarian while others view it as a republican ideal. Gustafson argues that understanding it in Christian terms adds a layer of moral depth, where self-interest becomes a pathway to virtue.
Christian Virtue in Democracy: Gustafson’s core argument is that Tocqueville’s concept is best understood within a Christian moral framework. Christianity, she argues, offers a way to harmonize self-interest with altruism, suggesting that even self-interested actions can align with the teachings of love for one’s neighbor, thus promoting both individual and societal good.
Religion as a Moral Guide: Gustafson explores Tocqueville’s assertion that religion, especially Christianity, is essential for countering the dangers of materialism and individualism in democratic societies. By guiding citizens toward a higher purpose, Christianity moderates self-interest and fosters a culture of mutual care.
Relevance to Modern Democracy: Gustafson concludes that Tocqueville’s insights into self-interest, when viewed through a Christian lens, offer valuable lessons for contemporary democracies. In a world increasingly driven by materialism and individualism, Tocqueville’s vision of intérêt bien entendu provides a framework for building a more cohesive and morally grounded society.
Comparison to Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
Gustafson’s analysis of Tocqueville’s intérêt bien entendu shares similarities with Adam Smith’s ideas in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, particularly in the way both thinkers connect self-interest with moral conduct. Smith proposed that individuals are motivated by a natural sympathy for others, which helps regulate self-interest and fosters societal cohesion. Similarly, Gustafson highlights Tocqueville’s view that self-interest, when understood properly, leads to actions that support the common good. Both Smith and Tocqueville reject the notion of pure selfishness, advocating instead for a balanced approach where individual well-being coincides with the welfare of others. However, while Smith’s moral framework is grounded in human sympathy, Tocqueville, as interpreted by Gustafson, emphasizes Christian teachings as the foundation for moderating self-interest. This Christian element differentiates Tocqueville’s approach from Smith’s, adding a spiritual dimension to how self-interest can guide moral behavior in a democratic society.
Summary of Hulett’s Paper:
Jeff Hulett is a banker, data scientist, and educator who focuses on financial decision-making and behavioral economics. His work connects Adam Smith's theories with modern tools like choice architecture. Hulett’s writings translate classical economic ideas into practical strategies for optimizing self-interest in today’s world.
Jeff Hulett’s paper, Adam Smith and How Choice Architecture Makes the Invisible Hand More Visible, focuses on Adam Smith’s concepts of self-interest and the invisible hand, explaining how they apply to modern decision-making. Hulett emphasizes that self-interest is often misunderstood as purely selfishness when, in fact, it is a mix of selfish and selfless motivations. Drawing from The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Hulett explains how individual self-interests shape market outcomes through a spontaneous reconciliation process known as the invisible hand. He introduces "choice architecture" as a modern tool that makes the invisible hand more visible, helping people optimize decisions by clarifying their self-interests. Hulett uses examples of everyday decision-making to illustrate how self-interest maps influence markets and broader societal outcomes. The paper also highlights how moral frameworks, like the Golden Rule, guide self-interest toward virtuous outcomes.
Table: Comparison of Gustafson’s and Hulett’s Papers
Gustafson’s Paper Section | Similarity | Difference |
Self-Interest and the Common Good | Both papers explore how self-interest aligns with broader societal benefits. Gustafson emphasizes how intérêt bien entendu (self-interest rightly understood) strengthens civil associations and political liberty, while Hulett argues that self-interest, when mapped and understood through tools like choice architecture, contributes to market efficiency and optimal social outcomes. Both agree that self-interest, when guided properly, serves the common good. | Gustafson’s paper frames self-interest within a moral and philosophical discussion, largely informed by Christianity and democratic values, while Hulett focuses on the economic mechanisms by which self-interest creates societal benefits through the invisible hand. Hulett’s approach is more practical and secular, emphasizing decision-making in market environments rather than moral or civic frameworks. |
Ambiguity in Interpretation | Both authors acknowledge the complexity and potential ambiguity of self-interest, highlighting that it can be interpreted in various ways depending on context. Gustafson notes that Tocqueville left intérêt bien entendu somewhat open to interpretation, while Hulett explains that individual self-interests are dynamic and shaped by varying motivations, making it challenging to predict outcomes in a straightforward manner. | Gustafson’s discussion focuses on the philosophical and moral ambiguity within Tocqueville’s framework, particularly the balance between self-interest and virtue. Hulett, on the other hand, discusses ambiguity in terms of practical decision-making and behavioral economics, emphasizing how self-interest can fluctuate based on framing effects, marketing, and external influences. Hulett’s ambiguity is more about real-world applications, while Gustafson’s is theoretical and philosophical. |
Christian Virtue in Democracy | Both papers touch on the role of moral guidelines in shaping self-interest, with Hulett mentioning the Golden Rule as an implicit moral check on self-interest and Gustafson delving into how Christianity provides a framework for aligning self-interest with the common good. Both recognize that moral principles can temper self-interest to make it more socially beneficial. | Gustafson’s discussion is deeply theological, focusing on how Christian virtue actively guides democratic citizens toward aligning self-interest with collective well-being, whereas Hulett’s mention of the Golden Rule is brief and more practical, reflecting how moral principles influence behavior in economic contexts without going into religious or theological detail. Hulett does not engage with religious doctrine in the same depth, focusing more on economic behaviors. |
Religion as a Moral Guide | Both authors agree that moral frameworks play a role in guiding self-interest. For Gustafson, Christianity acts as a vital moral compass in Tocqueville’s democracy, providing a higher law that tempers materialism and individualism. Hulett also acknowledges the influence of moral sentiment on decision-making, echoing Smith’s view that humans are driven by both self-interest and sympathy toward others. | While Gustafson’s analysis is centered on Christianity’s role in shaping moral behavior within a democratic context, Hulett approaches morality from a secular perspective, focusing on Smith’s idea of moral sentiments without linking them to religious teachings. Gustafson explicitly discusses religion’s role in civil society, whereas Hulett remains within the bounds of moral philosophy and behavioral economics, without emphasizing religion as a necessary guide. |
Relevance to Modern Democracy | Both papers explore how historical theories—Tocqueville’s for Gustafson and Smith’s for Hulett—remain relevant to contemporary society, especially in how self-interest functions within modern systems. They both argue that individual self-interest can support collective well-being if guided properly. | Gustafson’s relevance is more focused on the philosophical and civic aspects of democratic life, emphasizing how self-interest rightly understood promotes civil association and political liberty. In contrast, Hulett is more concerned with practical, day-to-day decision-making, particularly how tools like choice architecture can help individuals optimize their self-interest in economic and personal decisions. Hulett’s modern application is more focused on consumer behavior and decision science, while Gustafson focuses on democracy and moral behavior. |
Comparison to Adam Smith | Both papers engage with Adam Smith’s theories, particularly his exploration of self-interest in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Gustafson references Smith to help frame Tocqueville’s concept of intérêt bien entendu, while Hulett uses Smith’s work as the foundation for his entire argument about how self-interest drives market outcomes and societal benefits. Both recognize that Smith’s ideas about self-interest and moral sentiment are key to understanding human behavior in social contexts. | Gustafson uses Smith’s ideas as a supplementary point in her argument about Tocqueville’s understanding of self-interest, integrating them into a broader discussion of religion, democracy, and moral behavior. Hulett, on the other hand, places Smith at the center of his argument, focusing extensively on how Smith’s ideas about self-interest, the invisible hand, and moral sentiments apply to modern economics and decision-making. Smith is the foundation of Hulett’s argument, whereas he is a secondary reference in Gustafson’s work. |
Self-Interest Showdown: Gustafson’s Virtue vs. Hulett’s Delayed Selfishness
Hulett's self-interest framework, which compares the traditional economic consumption-savings model to self-interest by framing selfishness as “for today” and selflessness as “delayed selfishness,” offers an intriguing lens for understanding human behavior. This approach suggests that acts of selflessness are investments in future benefits, much like savings are investments for future consumption. When viewed through Gustafson’s analysis of Tocqueville’s intérêt bien entendu, there are both points of alignment and divergence. Gustafson’s interpretation of self-interest rightly understood emphasizes a moral framework, particularly through a Christian lens, where self-interest can align with virtue and the common good. While Hulett’s framework is more secular and practical, focusing on the behavioral and economic dimensions of self-interest, both authors recognize the long-term benefits of considering others in decision-making. Gustafson, however, might be cautious about fully endorsing Hulett’s "delayed selfishness" concept, as it seems to imply that selflessness is inherently transactional, whereas her Christian-influenced view sees true selflessness as virtuous and aligned with higher moral and religious principles, not merely a strategic deferral of self-benefit. Thus, while she might appreciate the practical utility of Hulett’s framework, Gustafson would likely advocate for a more spiritually grounded understanding of selflessness.
Conclusion:
Gustafson’s paper reinterprets Tocqueville’s intérêt bien entendu by infusing it with Christian moral teachings, suggesting that self-interest, when properly understood, can lead to both personal fulfillment and societal virtue. This interpretation offers a richer understanding of Tocqueville’s work, positioning religion as a crucial moderator of self-interest and a promoter of democratic well-being. Similarly, Hulett emphasizes the significance of self-interest but focuses more on its economic and decision-making aspects, illustrating how tools like choice architecture make the invisible hand more visible in everyday choices. By comparing both papers, we see that while they share a common theme of aligning self-interest with societal benefits, Gustafson delves deeper into philosophical and theological dimensions, while Hulett concentrates on practical and market-driven applications of self-interest. Both perspectives enrich our understanding of how self-interest functions within different societal frameworks.
In the "Self-Interest Showdown: Gustafson’s Virtue vs. Hulett’s Delayed Selfishness" section, the contrast between Hulett’s view of selflessness as “delayed selfishness” and Gustafson’s morally grounded self-interest highlights the differing ways each author interprets the motivations behind human actions. This comparison deepens our understanding of how self-interest can be framed in either religious or pragmatic contexts.
Comments